Abstract. This paper shows that a decision maker using the CAPM for valuing firms and making decisions may contradict Modigliani and Miller's Proposition I, if he adopts the widely-accepted disequilibrium NPV. As a consequence, CAPM-minded agents employing this NPV are open to arbitrage losses and miss arbitrage opportunities. As a result, even though the use of the disequilibrium NPV for decision-making is deductively drawn from the CAPM, its use for both valuation and decision should be rejected.
Introduction
In the corporate finance literature, the classical Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth CAPM) is employed for firm valuation as well as capital budgeting decision making (e.g. Rubinstein, 1973; Rao, 1992; Brealey and Myers, 2000; Damodaran, 2001; Fernández, 2002, or any other finance textbook). The value of a firm is given by the discounted free cash flows, where the discount rate is the risk-adjusted cost of capital. The latter is computed by making use of the CAPM pricing relation and equals the risk-free rate plus the product of the beta times the difference between expected market rate of return and risk-free rate of return. The value is the maximum price the buyer is ready to pay for the firm. If the firm's actual price is smaller that the firm value (or, in other terms, if the NPV is positive), then the purchase of the firm is a profitable investment Another important classical result in corporate financial theory is Modigliani and Miller's (1958) Proposition I (MM-I), which asserts that a firm value is invariant under changes in the debt/equity mix. It is common in finance to use the CAPM-derived disequilibrium NPV (e.g. Bossaerts and Ødegaard, 2001 ) to appraise firms and investments. This paper shows that such a tool is inconsistent with MM-I, which means that the principle of arbitrage, a fundamental principle of economic rationality (Nau and McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999) , is not fulfilled and that the disequilibrium Net Present Value is nonadditive.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 makes use of a simple example where two firms generating the same free cash flow are valued; one of them is levered, the other one is unlevered, and it turns out that the disequilibrium CAPM-based NPV provides different values.
Section 2 shows that economic agents using this NPV are open to arbitrage losses. In sections 3-4 MM-I is applied to value the two firms. Some remarks on nonadditivity are presented in section 5.
The concluding section briefly summarizes the results.
Notational conventions of the paper are collected in Table 1 . All the examples refer, for simplicity, to one period, but the same results hold for perpetual cash flows. All numbers are rounded off to the second or third decimal.
The example
Consider the security market described in Table 2 , where a risky asset and a risk-free asset are traded and two possible states may occur, conventionally labeled 'good' and 'bad', with probability 0.8 and 0.2 respectively.
1 The market is complete, is assumed to be in equilibrium (all marketed assets lie on the SML) and arbitrage is not possible. Suppose now that economic agent B (=buyer) faces the following problem: He is offered the opportunity of purchasing one of two firms, both of which will operate only the next period and then will shut down. One of the firm is equityfinanced (firm U), the other one is levered (firm L). Agent U (=unlevered) owns the shares of firm U and is ready to sell the firm at a minimum price of 9000. Firm L's shares are owned by agent E (=equity) which is ready to sell the shares for a minimum of 7000, while agent D (=debt) owns firm L's debt, which is a loan just stipulated for an amount of 2000 with a 7.14% contractual rate. For such a loan agent D is ready to accept not less than the 2000 just lent to the firm. Agent B is willing to evaluate the two firms and decide about possible purchase. To this end, he analyzes the two firms and after thorough investigations, studies and forecasts, he collects the following data (see Table 3 ):
• The Free Cash Flow of both firms at time 1 will be 13300 in good state and 7800 in bad state 2
• The Debt Cash Flow of firm L at time 1 will be 7500=7000(1.0714). Given the forecasts on the Free Cash Flow, the debt is not risky.
• The Equity Cash Flow of firm L at time 1 will be consequently 5800 in good state and 300 in bad state.
1 The market is a very simple one just for the sake of convenience (for a market with three securities and some results dealing with capital budgeting decisions see Magni, 2007) . 2 The free cash flow of firm U is obviously an equity cash flow, given that the firm is unlevered. 
The further step is to compute the required rates of return using the SML (Security Market Line) Applying (5) to the particular case at hand, agent B finds (see Table 3 He spends 50 today and receives nothing at time 1 (the cash flows for agent B are collected in Table   4 . Agent DEU's cash flow are the same reversed in sign).
Firm value according to MM-I
Let us calculate the firm value using MM-I, therefore making use of the principle of arbitrage. To sum up, the CAPM-based values of firm U and firm L do not coincide each other and both are inconsistent with the (unique) value found via arbitrage pricing (i.e. via MM-I), which guarantees that the one-price law holds.
It is also noteworthy that agent B is missing an arbitrage opportunity. He actually rejects to purchase firm L (equity+debt). But he could sell short 36.739 units of the risk-free security and 55 shares of the risky security, while buying firm L for the total amount of 9000. At time 0, he would have a net gain of 55(100)+36.739(100)−9000=173.9 whereby at time 1 he could use the free cash flow of firm L to close off the position in the security market, with no net expenditure. Therefore, users of CAPM-based (disequilibrium) NPV are not only subject to arbitrage losses, but they may even miss some arbitrage opportunities.
Generalizing
The examples above shown are just particular cases of a more general result. Let ) (D V be the firm value seen as a function of the debt. 5 Formally, MM-I may be rephrased saying that
We now show that if firm valuation is realized via disequilibrium values, eq. (6) 
Nonadditivity
The results above shown may be rephrased in terms of additivity. To see a project or a firm as an aggregate quantity generating free cash flow (firm U) or a disaggregate quantity generating equity cash flow and debt cash flow (firm L) is only a matter of convention, and the property of 
NPV(E)+NPV(D)=NPV(E+D).
But the previous sections just imply that the NPV is nonadditive, since Magni, 2002; Magni, 2007 , for issues of nonadditivity).
From a decisional point of view, the nonadditivity of the valuation has serious consequences for decision making: Agent B has the opportunity of purchasing firm U's shares, or, alternatively, buying both equity and debt of firm L. The two alternatives are just the same from a financial point of view. Yet, as Table 3 shows, agent B considers it profitable to buy U's equity (NPV=150), whereas he considers it not worth purchasing equity and debt of firm L, (NPV= −99). He then takes two different decisions for the same course of action. This absurd behavior is just due to the nonadditivity of the NPV. Nonadditivity means that valuation and/or decision changes if the problem at hand is differently framed, although the descriptions of the problem are logically equivalent. Financially, the cash flow generated by a firm should be valued by decision makers univocally, irrespective of whether it is considered an aggregate quantity (FCF) or a disaggregate quantity (ECF+CFD). Therefore, agent B incurs what behavioral scholars call a "framing effect" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Qualls and Puto, 1989; Roszkowski and Snelbecker, 1990) .
Conclusions
This paper shows that:
• The use of CAPM-based disequilibrium NPV for valuing firms is not consistent with arbitrage pricing • Agents using disequilibrium NPVs are subject to framing effects Although the NPV as a decision rule is deductively drawn from the CAPM, its use for valuation and for decision-making is a mis-use, leading to biases, arbitrage losses, misses of arbitrage profits, framing effects. 7 7 It is worth noting the use of the equilibrium NPV does not guarantee correct valuations (see Dybvig and Ingersoll, 1982) . 
